Run time packing is a common approach malware use to obfuscate their payloads, and automatic unpacking is, therefore, highly relevant.
INTRODUCTION
Conceptually, run time packers encode a binary with obfuscation techniques such as compression and encryption to harden analysis of their code. is hardening signi cantly increases the e ort needed to reverse engineer a given sample, whether manually or automatically, because it requires inverting the anti-analysis techniques used by the packer to understand the full capabilities of the malware. Run time packing is a highly e ective anti-analysis technique, and estimates show more than 80% of malware samples come packed [15] . e combination of needing to unpack samples before proper analysis is feasible, and that most malware samples come packed makes it desirable to develop approaches that automatically unpack malware.
Techniques and tools for automatic unpacking malware have received a lot of a ention in the literature [10, 17, 22, 23, 28, 29, 33, 42] . Despite this large amount of research, the vast amounts of work rely on the same core principle, the "write-then-execute" heuristic.
is heuristic deploys the key observation that in order to execute the encrypted code, it rst must be decrypted and, therefore, be dynamically generated. e most common approach by previous work is, therefore, to execute a given sample, monitor all memory writes made by the malware, and whenever dynamically wri en memory executes, the unpacker identi es this memory as decrypted.
e tools then dump this speci c memory to enable follow-up inspection.
ere are two main limitations to the approach of existing work. First, the "write-then-execute" heuristic is not well-suited for packers that perform system-wide unpacking. is is because the heuristic only captures code that is dynamically generated explicitly by the malware and not malicious code that is dynamically generated via benign code which, unfortunately, is frequently the case in multiprocess unpacking. Consequently, existing unpackers are mainly suitable for single-process malware and new approaches to capture system-wide malware unpacking are needed. Second, the primary output of existing work is memory dumps or naively constructed PE les of the dynamically generated code. e output lacks structure, is o en an unreasonable over-or under-approximation of the actual malware code, and many obfuscation techniques from the packing process, e.g. obfuscation of external dependencies, remain in the output. As such, the analysis that follows must overcome these obfuscation techniques to enable meaningful analysis of the code.
is is a problem because the purpose of unpacking is to facilitate follow-up analysis and not to give any conclusive answer about the malware itself. e limitations described above reoccur in existing work, and we argue that an essential reason for this is because existing work widely uses the same set of benchmark applications to validate their solutions. ese benchmark applications consist of packers that are out-dated and built more than a decade ago. Consequently, the empirical assessment of novel tools occur with old, and o en similar, techniques that do not accurately re ect the challenges posed by modern-day malware packers. To ensure that our novel tools are relevant, we need new benchmark applications that can be used for pro ling novel unpackers.
ese benchmarks must explore corner-cases of modern packing techniques and be easily accessible to anti-malware researchers.
e goal of this paper is to develop techniques that overcome the limitations of existing work highlighted above. We present a uni ed approach to precisely unpack malware samples with system-wide execution, dynamically generated code, custom IAT loading and API call obfuscations. e aim is to provide unpacked code that is well-suited for follow-up analysis via manual reverse engineering or o -the-shelf static analysis tools. To this end, Minerva deploys a combination of dynamic and static analysis to amplify the e ectiveness of automatic unpacking. e novel techniques presented in Minerva rely on information ow, which makes it highly precise and capable of unpacking malware samples in a system-wide context. Minerva models execution waves on a per-process basis and each process with malware execution operate within the context of a single execution wave at any given moment. is provides for a clear wave model and implementation but may result in duplicate content amongst waves, for example, when execution waves use code from an earlier execution wave.
Minerva takes as input a 32-bit Windows binary and outputs at least one Portable Executable (PE) le per execution wave. is has the bene t of mostly independent PE les but also means the duplicate content of multiple waves will exist in multiple PE les. In order to produce output that is useful for follow-up analysis, Minerva captures how the malware uses external dependencies throughout the entire execution and maps this to each execution wave, resulting in PE les with valid import address tables and patched API calls. Finally, Minerva also performs static analysis to identify relevant malware code within each execution wave. In addition to our unpacker, we also propose a new benchmark suite with applications that combine code-injection techniques, dynamically generated code and obfuscation of external dependencies to overcome the limitations of empirical evaluation in existing work. We demonstrate our unpacker empirically against synthetic and real-world malware samples.
Our main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We present a novel approach that combines dynamic and static analysis techniques to unpack malware that executes across the entire system automatically. e approach focuses on precise analysis and outputs unpacked samples that are well-suited for follow-up static analysis.
• We present a new benchmark suite with samples exploring modern-day packing behaviours. To the knowledge of the author, this is the rst benchmark suite that comprises synthetic applications aimed at evaluating unpackers.
• We implement the techniques into Minerva and present an extensive empirical evaluation based on synthetic applications and real-world malware samples.
BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW
Packing is an umbrella term that refers to a set of various concrete obfuscation techniques and there is no clear de nition on the speci c obfuscation techniques it encapsulates. is section clari es the obfuscation techniques we treat in this paper and the limitations of existing work that motivate us. In total, we have compiled six core limitations across two general obfuscation techniques.
Dynamically generated code
e obfuscation technique that is most commonly associated with packing is dynamically generated code. In its simplest terms, dynamically generated code is when an application writes memory at run time and then proceeds to execute this memory. Most o en malware does this by containing encrypted code inside its binary image and decrypting this at run time in order to execute it. Existing automated unpackers identify dynamically generated code with the write-then-execute heuristic. is heuristic partitions the malware execution into a set of layers L 0 , L 1 , . . . L n such that each layer constitutes dynamically generated code. Layer L 0 represents the instructions of the binary malware image when rst loaded into memory and L i+1 represents the instructions executed on memory wri en by the instructions in layer L i . Limitation 1.1: the write-then-execute heuristic is unable to capture dynamically generated malicious code via benign code. e strict relationship that instructions of one layer must be dynamically generated explicitly by instructions from a previous layer severely limits the generality of existing work. Malware that uses benign code to dynamically generate its malicious code go unnoticed by this model. e implications of this limitation are substantial for capturing dynamically generated code across multiple processes by way of code-reuse a acks or OS-provided APIs since it is not the instructions of the malicious code that does the writing of memory. Rather, it is benign code that is manipulated by the malware into writing dynamically generated malicious code. Limitation 1.2: existing work unreasonably approximate relevant dynamically generated memory. Whenever an unpacker observes dynamically generated code it outputs the code for follow-up analysis. To do this, the unpacker must have a de nition of what parts of dynamically generated memory are relevant to the unpacked code. is is because not all memory that is dynamically generated, e.g. the stack, is relevant for the unpacked output. However, this step of identifying relevant memory is highly overlooked by previous work. For example, neither Renovo [23] nor EtherUnpack [10] clearly describe the speci c memory they extract during unpacking, and Mutant-X [17] dumps the entire memory image of a process when observing dynamically generated code. ese are unreasonably imprecise and leave follow-up analysis with the task of identifying a needle in a haystack. Limitation 1.3: existing work output raw memory scattered across many memory dumps.
e majority of existing unpackers [6, 10, 23, 42] make li le e ort to output the unpacked code in a coherent data structure but rather output the unpacked malware in the shape of raw memory dumps. e problem is that when malware dynamically generates code, this may be sca ered across several regions, and some of these may also be data-only sections. A precise unpacker should not output incoherent raw memory regions, but rather a suitable data structure that combines these memory regions in an appropriate manner, e.g. re-basing where needed, that enables meaningful follow-up analysis.
Obfuscating external dependencies
e way malware interacts with its environment is signi cant to understanding its malicious activities. We capture this understanding by analysing how the malware uses the OS via API calls and system calls, and these are, therefore, natural obfuscation targets for malware. Limitation 2.1: existing unpackers fail to accurately correlate API calls to malicious code. ere is o en a large portion of dynamically generated code that must be covered when analysing packed malware. To quickly navigate towards relevant parts, we rely on the malware's use of APIs. However, existing unpackers fail to accurately correlate API calls within a process to the packed code, or even, more generally, a ribute whether a given API call was performed by malicious or benign code. Consequently, they report unreasonable estimates of API-usage by the malware.
In order to circumvent this limitation, the unpacker needs to maintain knowledge of which code belongs to the malware and also be able to identify the instruction responsible for a given API call. From an engineering point of view, most unpackers will be able to augment their systems with solutions to these problems with a modest implementation e ort. However, fundamentally, this limitation is guarded by the ability to correctly identify what code belongs to the packed malware, which is closely related to Limitation 1.1 and Limitation 1.2. We identify it here because it is an essential feature in terms of understanding how the unpacked malware code uses external dependencies and something that current unpackers do not support. For example, when the unpacker from Ugarte et al. is matched with a sample 1 from the Tinba malware family that creates one layer of dynamically generated code before injecting code into the Windows process winver.exe, the unpacker reports that the dynamically generated code performs 1666 API calls from more than 350 di erent API functions. is result far exceeds the correct count, which is fourteen API calls from ten di erent API functions.
Limitation 2.2: output from existing unpackers do not show API-usage when faced with custom API-call resolution. ere is an intricate relationship between dynamically generated code and API call obfuscation. In regular PE binaries, the import address table (IAT) specify the external modules the given application uses. At run time, the operating system linker uses this IAT to load these modules and resolve the addresses of the speci c functions the binary imports. However, packed code minimises the IAT to hide how it uses external dependencies, and, instead of using the regular OS linker, the packer deploys a custom linker to resolve its imports.
Custom API resolution can happen at any moment(s) during execution and memory dumps taken by existing unpackers are, therefore, susceptible to occur when the malware is yet to resolve its external dependencies. Unfortunately, it is rare that API resolution has occurred the moment dynamically generated code is observed, which is precisely when existing work dumps the memory [6, 10, 23] . Figure 1 shows the di erences of matching a traditional unpacker ( Figure 1a ) with a sample that has custom API resolution and matching the same sample with an unpacker that accurately captures API-usage in unpacked code (Figure 1b) , in this case, a result of Minerva. It is clear that without knowledge of the API calls it is hopeless to determine the activities of the code, whereas it is clear from the Minerva-generated code. Limitation 2.3: existing unpackers are unable to identify obfuscated API calls. Orthogonal to the resolution of API calls, some packed malware samples will go a step further and directly obfuscate the way they call external APIs. In general, there are many ways for malware to obfuscate API calls. In Figure 1a , we see that the raw calls from Tinba depend on the value of EBX, which 1 sha256 078a122a9401dd47a61369ac769d9e707d9e86bdf7ad91708510b9a4584e8d4 (a) Traditional unpacker, from [42] (b) Minerva in this case contains the base-o set of a custom IAT by the malware. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows an example from an application packed with the PEtite 2 packer where the code calls a Windows API function by pushing a value on top of the stack, rotating that value and then transferring execution via a ret instruction to the rotated value on top of the stack.
e output of existing unpackers is not capable of resolving obfuscated API calls in the unpacked code. is is a problem because it is much harder and sometimes impossible, to determine the destination of the branch instructions in follow-up analysis than it is for the unpacker. For example, without knowledge about the contents of EBX, the data at the address being read and the process layout, it is impossible to determine the destination of the given branch instructions and if they are API calls.
Solution overview
e goal of this paper is to develop system-wide, precise and general unpacking techniques. Speci cally, our goal is to input a malware binary into our Minerva tool and output PE les that precisely capture the malware code post-decryption and decompression, and also capture how the malware uses external dependencies. e aim is to output PE les that are well-suited for follow-up analysis by o -the-shelf static analysis tools and manual investigation.
To achieve our goal, we must overcome the limitations highlighted above. First, to overcome the limitations when dealing with dynamically generated code, we need a solution that can (limitation 1.1) identify dynamically generated memory across the system; (limitation 1.2) extract precisely the memory that is relevant to the malware; and (limitation 1.3) combine the relevant dynamically generated code into meaningful and related structures. Second, to 2 h ps://www.un4seen.com/petite/ overcome the limitations against malware that obfuscates external dependencies, the solution must also (limitation 2.1) precisely capture the use of API calls within the malware code; (limitation 2.2 and 2.3) do this in the context of custom API resolution and obfuscated API calls; and, nally, map these observations to the output, so it is readily available for follow-up analysis.
e solution we come up with, and implement into Minerva, deploys a two-step approach following the architecture shown in Figure 3 . First, we use the dynamic analysis in Minerva to precisely extract packed code and the API calls of the malware, and then we use static analysis to construct PE les based on the unpacked code. Speci cally, the rst step is to capture the malware execution trace using dynamic taint analysis in a similar fashion to Tartarus presented by Korzynski and Yin [29] . en, we abstract the malware execution trace into execution waves based on information ow analysis such that an execution wave is a process-level construct that represents dynamically generated code in the malware. During the run time analysis, Minerva also ensures precise identi cation of API calls by the instructions in the malware execution trace. From the rst step, we get a set of execution waves consisting of memory dumps, the malware execution trace of each wave and more. e second step Minerva performs is to group related memory within each execution wave using disassembly techniques. Minerva then converts each group of related dumps into a new PE le with a new import address table, and patches API calls based on static analysis and the API calls observed during dynamic analysis. In the following sections, we detail these steps.
SYSTEM-WIDE MALWARE TRACING
A key component of our system is the ability to trace the malware throughout the entire operating system using dynamic taint analysis. We implement the techniques in Tartarus [29] to do this. In order to make this paper self-contained we brie y summarise the idea in this section, however, for complete description of the approach we refer to [29] .
Abstract model of execution environment
We de ne a formal environment in which we can reason about executions in a sandbox. e model we present is an extension of work from Dinaburg et al. [10] . We consider execution at the machine instruction level, and since an instruction can access memory and CPU registers directly we consider a system state as the combination of memory contents and CPU registers. Let M be the set of all memory states and C be the set of all possible CPU register states. We denote all possible instructions as I , where each instruction can be considered a machine recognisable combination of opcode and operands stored at a particular place in memory.
A program P is modelled as a tuple (M P , ϵ P ) where M P is the memory associated with the program and ϵ P is an instruction in M P which de nes the entry point of the program. ere are o en many programs executing on a system and each of these may communicate with each other through the underlying OS. As such, we model the execution environment E as the underlying OS and the other programs running on the system. We de ne a transition function δ E : I ×M ×C → I ×M ×C to represent the execution of an instruction in the environment E. It de nes how execution of an instruction updates the execution state and determines the next instruction to be executed. e trace of instructions obtained by executing program P in execution environment E is then de ned to be the ordered set T (P, E) = (i 0 , . . . , i l ) where
We note here that the execution trace does not explicitly capture which instructions are part of the program, with the exception of i 0 , but rather all the instructions executed on the system including instructions in other processes and the kernel. For any two elements in the execution trace i j ∈ T (P, E) and i k ∈ T (P, E) we write i j < i k if j < k, i j > i k if j > k and otherwise i j = i k . We use this to de ne ordering between the instructions of the sequence.
Malware execution trace
We now introduce the concept of malware execution trace. Suppose P is a malware program and P A is some malware tracer that aims to collect P's execution trace. Malware program P is interested in evading analysis and gain privilege escalation by using code-reuse a acks and code injections. As such, the execution trace of the malware may contain instructions that are not members of program P's memory M P .
To monitor the malware across the environment, the malware monitor P A maintains a shadow memory that allows it to label the memory and the CPU registers. is shadow memory is updated for each instruction in the execution trace. Let S ⊆ M ×C be the set of all possible shadow memories. We then de ne the propagation function δ A : S × I → S to be the function that updates the shadow memory when an instruction executes. e list of shadow memories collected by the malware tracer is now de ned as the ordered set:
e job of the malware tracer is to determine for each instruction in the execution trace whether the instruction belongs to the malware or not. To do this, the analyser uses the predicate Λ A : S × I → {true, f alse}. e malware execution trace is now given as the sequence of instructions for which Λ A is true and we call Λ A the inclusion predicate. We de ne the malware execution trace formally as follows:
De nition 1. Let T (P, E) be an execution trace and P A a malware tracer. e malware execution trace is the ordered set Π A = (m 0 , . . . , m d ) where:
e above de nition says that the malware execution trace is a subsequence (ordering is preserved) of the entire whole-system trace and for each instruction in the malware execution trace there is a corresponding instruction in the whole-system trace for which the inclusion predicate is true.
e malware execution trace gives us a de nition we can use to reason about the properties of malware tracers. In particular, for a given malware tracer it highlights the propagation function, δ A , and the inclusion predicate, Λ A , to be the de ning parts. Having constructed our model of malware tracers and identi ed the key aspects that determine how they collect the execution trace, we now move on to present how Minerva precisely captures system-wide propagation.
Tracing the malware execution
e goal is to capture malware execution throughout the whole system in a precise and general manner.
e overall idea is to use dynamic taint analysis to mark the malware under analysis as tainted and then capture its system-wide execution by following how the taint propagates through the system. Algorithm 1 gives an overview of our approach to capturing the malware execution trace. Assuming the rst instruction executed on the system is the entry point of the malware, the rst step (line 1) is to taint the memory making up the malware. In particular, we taint the entire malware module, including data and code sections. Next, execution continues until there is no more taint or a user-de ned timeout occurs, and for each instruction executed we check if the memory making up the instruction is tainted (line 7). We include the instruction in the malware execution trace if the instruction is tainted (line 8). For each instruction in the malware execution trace we taint all the output of the instruction, so as to follow memory generated by the malware that is generated independently of the initial state of the malware memory, as shown by the Update algorithm in Algorithm 2 (line 3-5).
INFORMATION FLOW EXECUTION WAVES
Given the malware execution trace, the next step is to partition it into execution waves. e goal of execution waves is to capture dynamically generated malicious code independently of who wrote the code and on the basis that the generated code must originate from the malware. However, we consider execution waves to be more than just a sequence of instructions.
e set of execution waves gives an explicit representation of an entire application, including dynamically generated malicious code, and each execution wave may, therefore, include both executable and non-executable data.
In this section we give a semantics for execution waves (Section 4.1) and describe how we collect the waves in practice (Section 4.2).
Execution wave semantics
e goal of our execution wave semantics is to clearly de ne the conversion of a malware sample's execution into waves of dynamically generated malicious code. As such, we describe the waves in relation to an execution trace T (P, E) described in Section 3.1.
We partition the malware execution into waves on a processlevel basis. We map every instruction in the malware execution trace i ∈ Π A to a process P and a wave within this process W x . We denote P W x to mean wave x within process , and every process with malicious code execution contains a sequence of waves P .Ω = P W 0 , . . . , P W n with |P .Ω| ≥ 1. We denote the initial wave in which malware execution begins as P ϵ W ϵ and the set Φ Π contains all execution waves for a given malware execution trace Π A . For each instruction in the malware execution trace, we rst identify the process in which they execute and then the wave they belong to within their respective process.
Formally, we de ne an execution wave as follows.
De nition 2. An execution wave is a tuple composed of:
• A sequence of instructions I = i 0 , . . . , i n executed in the given wave. We have i 0 to be the entry point of the wave;
• a shadow memory S, which is a set of ordered pairs (m addr , m b t e ) that contains the tainted memory making up the wave, including both code and data memory; • the tainted writes T which is a set of ordered pairs (t addr , t b t e ) that holds the tainted memory wri en by instructions in P since i 0 , where P is the process of the execution wave.
Next, we present a set that formalises our requirements for partitioning a complete execution trace into a set of execution waves.
e purpose of this de nition is to capture every layer of dynamically generated malicious code and not restrict a minimal overlap between the content of each execution wave. In the following, we write for two instructions i, j, i < j if i comes before j in the malware execution trace, and vice versa.
De nition 3. Let T(P,E) be an instruction execution trace and Π A the corresponding malware execution trace. e set of execution waves is then given Φ Π = {P 0 , . . . , P n } where:
• ∀i ∈ Π A ∃P x ∈ Φ Π |i ∈ P x .I.
• For any P W x and P W z in Φ Π where x < z we have that
is says that there is a strict ordering in the malware execution trace between the instructions of any two waves in a given process P .Ω.
is says that the shadow memory for all execution waves must either exist in the shadow memory of the initial wave or be composed of tainted memory wri en by a wave that started earlier.
• For any wave P W x ∈ Φ Π we have that ∀i
is says the memory of any instruction in each execution wave must be present in the shadow memory of the given wave.
An important aspect of De nition 3 is that the second bullet enforces a strict ordering between instructions in the set of execution waves for each process. e e ect of this is that we preclude instructions from any given execution wave to be used in any other execution wave.
e reason we do this is that it creates a clear history of execution wave progress within each process, and it becomes easier to implement since it is only necessary to maintain one execution wave per process. e drawback is that when malware transfers execution to code from an earlier execution wave, we include some content of the earlier execution wave into the current execution wave. In this way, we may end up with waves that overlap in their shadow memory, but, naturally, this can be stripped during post-processing. However, we have found this to be no major issue and that the trade-o works well in practice. However, we leave the door open and encourage future work in other models, e.g. more re ned models.
Collecting the execution waves
In practice, we only associate one wave with a given process at any given moment. erefore, to collect the execution waves, it is su cient to keep track of the current wave in each process. We initially only have one, wave which is the wave inside of the process executing the malicious application. e shadow memory S of this wave is the malware module when loaded into memory, and the set of tainted writes is initially the empty set, T = ∅. We then update the set of tainted writes whenever an instruction writes tainted memory following our Update function shown in Algorithm 2. // is the instruction tainted?
To capture execution waves, we monitor for each process the relationship between the currently executing instruction, the shadow memory and the set of tainted writes following Algorithm 1. Specifically, for every tainted instruction in the malware execution trace, there are four possible cases:
(1) e address of the instruction is not in the shadow memory and not in the tainted writes (line 10 Algorithm 1); (2) e address of the instruction is not in the shadow memory but in the tainted writes (line 13 Algorithm 1); (3) e address of the instruction is in the shadow memory and in the tainted writes but the content of the shadow memory is not similar to current instruction (line 16 Algorithm 1); (4) e address of the instruction is in the shadow memory and in the tainted writes and the content of the shadow memory is equivalent to the memory of the current instruction (line 18 Algorithm 1). Case (1) happens in two scenarios. e rst case is when tainted memory is transferred across processes via shared memory. For example, if tainted memory is wri en to memory shared by processes P 1 and P 2 and the instructions performing the writing is in P 1 , then the tainted writes will not be in P 2 .T or P 2 .S because we only populate P 2 .T if instructions from P 2 .T are writing to the address space of P 2 . e second case is when code from the current wave transfers execution to code that is part of an earlier wave. is is because the shadow memory of each wave does not propagate to the proceeding wave, but the memory remains tainted nonetheless. Whenever we observe case (1) we add the memory of the instruction to the shadow memory of the current process and also append the instruction to the sequence of instructions in the current wave. In this case, we update the shadow memory of the current wave with the executing instruction.
In case (4) the current instruction is simply part of the current execution wave, and this is by far the most common case. In this case, we append the instruction to the instruction sequence of the current wave. In cases (2) and (3) we consider the current instruction to be the entry point of a new execution wave. Speci cally, in case (2) the instruction is dynamically generated in a new memory region and in case (3) the instruction is dynamically generated on top of already existing malware code.
In the event of a new wave, we log information about the current wave following Algorithm 3. First, we log the instructions executed in the current wave, tainted writes and the shadow memory, which includes dumping every page in which there is a tainted write and also dumping the shadow memory. en we set the shadow memory of the next wave to be the tainted writes of the current wave and set the tainted writes to be the empty set.
ALGORITHM 2: Update
Data: (input)Instruction i, memory propagation set P , Tainted writes T . Result: Next instruction i ne x t , memory propagation set P , Tainted writes T 1 P ← pr opa at e t aint (i, P) 2 i ne x t ← ex ec inst r (i)
e execution waves capture dynamically generated code independent of who wrote the code including dynamically generated malicious code via benign code. We achieve this generality because the shadow table is composed of tainted memory and tainted memory propagates through both benign and malicious instructions. Since the tainted code originates from the malware itself, it is dynamically generated malicious code. is property distinguishes our technique from previous work and allows it to be more general without losing precision.
e output from collecting the execution waves is the sequence of waves executed during the malware execution. For each execution wave, we have memory dumps of the tainted memory during its execution and the list of instructions that belong to each wave. As such, we have an explicit representation of each instruction in the malware execution in the form of its raw bytes, and we also have memory dumps of any non-executed malicious (tainted) memory. All of this information will then be used to reconstruct PE les that are e ective for follow-up static analysis.
PRECISE DEPENDENCY CAPTURE
In order for the PE les to be useful for follow-up static analysis, they must show how the malware uses external dependencies. As described in Section 2.2, we must consider custom API call resolution and obfuscated API calls. To this end, we capture the destination of every branch instruction in the malware execution trace and check if it corresponds to the beginning of a function in an external module.
To collect the addresses of functions in each process with malware execution, we iterate the export table of every module in the given process and capture the address of every function it exports. We put these functions in a per-process map that pairs function addresses with their respective function names. Minerva also comes with the possibility to speed up this process using pre-calculated function o sets for a given DLL. As such, with pre-calculated o sets, we only need to know the base address of a given imported module inside the malware process to compute the absolute addresses of its exported functions.
To capture the API functions that the malware calls, we obtain the destination of every branching instruction in the malware execution trace. If the branch destination is in the set of functions exported by any of the dynamically loaded modules within the execution trace, it means the malware performs an API call. We log every API call and for some functions the parameters as well. For many functions in the Windows API, the return value is also essential to understand the semantics of the call. To capture the return value and output parameters, we note the return address of the API call on the stack and read the output of the function whenever the return address executes. We also monitor functions like LoadLibrary to update our export table when processes load new modules.
Our approach to monitoring API calls precisely captures the API calls performed by instructions in the malware execution trace and do not capture API calls performed by benign code inside a process in which the malware executes. Furthermore, because we know the speci c malicious instruction for each execution wave, it is trivial to map API calls to execution waves. is precise mapping highly improves the precision of the analysis in comparison to sandboxes that capture API calls globally within a process since many of these calls are irrelevant to the malware (this is particularly true in code injected processes).
Minerva currently does not take any e orts when malware hides API usage by way of stolen bytes or copying of the Windows code. Furthermore, if malware deploys inlined library code or statically linked libraries, then Minerva will not consider these as external dependencies. is is a limitation we discuss further in Section 8.
STATIC RECONSTRUCTION OF EXECUTION WAVES
A er collecting the execution waves and external dependencies, we need to combine these into PE les. For each execution wave we construct a set of PE les based on the content of their respective shadow memory and for each PE le we need three ingredients: (1) e speci c memory pages of an execution wave that makes up the PE le; (2) the PE's IAT; (3) the entry point of the le.
e static analysis component of Minerva performs three main steps. First, it groups related memory dumps of each execution wave, then identi es external dependencies in each of these memory groups and, nally, builds new PE les based on the results of the two previous steps.
Merging over-approximated shadow memories
e output from collecting the execution waves includes, for each execution wave, page-level memory dumps of the shadow memory and tainted writes. Intuitively, it can seem appropriate to convert all of these memory dumps into one large PE le and use this for static analysis. However, we have found this to be imprecise in practice because it is rarely the case that all of the memory dumps are relevant to the malware. On the one hand, the shadow memory is a conservative approximation as we capture some memory that is not executable code, and some memory is a result of over-propagated taint. On the other hand, we do not want to reconstruct PE les purely based on executed memory since this will miss non-executed, yet still, malicious executable code, and also relevant data sections.
To avoid this imprecision, we divide the page-level memory dumps from the dynamic analysis into smaller groups, such that the pages of each group are related and no page in a given partition relates to any other partition.
e goal with this is to capture the parts of the malware that are self-contained and represent the application timelessly. To this end, we create a PE le with multiple sections for each partition. Figure 4 shows an example of how we select the speci c tainted pages that are relevant for the unpacked malware from a set of tainted pages output by Minerva's dynamic analysis component. e rst step is to identify the tainted pages with malicious code execution. To do this, we rst iterate the sequence of instructions executed in a given execution wave and collect all pages that hold instructions from this sequence. Following this, we iteratively collect neighbouring pages until there are no more neighbouring pages and the result is a set of page-level intervals where some pages hold executed code, and other pages neighbour up to these.
is corresponds to the rst two steps in Figure 4 . Following this, we identify pages in the shadow memory that relate to each interval. To construct self-contained PE les, we capture data-dependencies and control-dependencies to other pages in the shadow memory for each interval. We do this by performing speculative disassembly on each memory dump to capture cross-references to other memory dumps. is step gives us crossreferences for each interval, and we then iteratively merge related intervals such that no interval will have cross-references to other intervals. Following this approach, we end up with a set of groups of memory dumps, and we create a PE le for each of these groups. In the example in Figure 4 we end up with one group consisting of two intervals and will, therefore, create one PE le.
Dependency reconstruction
To reconstruct external dependencies in our PE les, we need to rebuild the IAT of the binary and patch instructions to rely on this new IAT.
To construct the IAT, we rst identify API calls made by instructions belonging to the pages of each memory group. We identify these by matching the API hooks collected during dynamic analysis to instructions of the respective code wave and the pages of the given memory group. We include each unique API function in the IAT of the reconstructed PE le.
Although we know which instructions branch to external APIs from the malware execution trace, the branch destinations may not be visible from the memory dumps themselves. e nal step in constructing PE les is, therefore, to map the instructions that perform API calls to our newly generated IAT by patching them on the binary level. Unfortunately, binary patching is not an easy task since some instructions may require for us to rearrange the instructions in the binary, and this may subsequently break it. In practice, we patch branch instructions that are 6 bytes long, e.g. call [0xdeadbeef], because we can do this without rearranging instructions. We do not patch instructions that are less than 6 bytes, e.g. call eax. However, we still keep the cross-references so they can be used in more abstract representations in a follow-up analysis.
Final PE construction
In order to construct the nal PE le, we need to know the entry point and the PE sections to put in the le. To identify the entry point, we go through the instruction sequence of the given wave and identify the rst instruction in the range of each memory dump group. In order to construct the PE sections, we rely on the memory intervals that we end up with in each memory group. For example, in our example from Figure 4 we end up with one group and two intervals ([0x5300000-0x5303000], [0x6200000-0x6201000]). We make each of these intervals into an individual section of the PE le and place the newly generated IAT in-between the PE header and these sections. e reason we make each of them into individual sections is to avoid rebasing each interval. e pages we dump from virtual memory are placed at various locations, and each of them must keep this virtual address in the PE le. As such, the PointerToRawData and VirtualAddress values in each section header will be signi cantly di erent, and the VirtualAddress points to the base address of each interval as it was when dumped from virtual memory (0x5300000 and 0x6200000 in the example in Figure 4 ).
EVALUATION
Having presented the core techniques of Minerva, we now move on to evaluate Minerva using multiple benchmarks with respect to the following research questions:
(1) Does Minerva precisely capture dynamically generated code and the malware's API calls? (2) Does Minerva improve results over previous work? (3) Is Minerva relevant for common malware analysis tasks? Tainted pages from dynamic analysis 0x7751000 0x7731000 0x7557000 0x7551000 0x6201000 0x6200000 0x5901000 0x5303000 0x5302000 0x5301000 0x5300000 Collect pages with malicious execution.
0x5301000 0x5300000
Gather neighbouring pages. 0x5301000 0x5300000 0x5302000 0x5303000
Speculative disassembly to collect pages by crossreferencing. 0x5303000 0x5302000 0x5301000 0x5300000 0x6200000 0x6201000 Figure 4 : e process of identifying which tainted pages from dynamic analysis that are relevant when reconstructing unpacked PE les. In the example, the reconstructed PE le has two sections (0x5300000-0x5303000 and 0x6200000-0x6201000).
To facilitate the research questions above, we gather four sets of benchmark applications comprising synthetic applications as well as real-world malware applications:
(1) Benchmark #1 : Ground truth data set. We develop a new benchmark suite that combines the use of dynamically generated code, code injection and obfuscation of external dependencies. In total, we have developed nine di erent applications, and they are all described in Table 2 . e applications in the benchmark suite represent many of the challenges posed by real-world packers. To the knowledge of the authors, this is the rst dedicated benchmark suite for challenging the a ributes of unpackers where none of the samples relies on packers developed by third-party teams. e bene t of this benchmark suite is that each sample poses speci c challenges that are clearly de ned, the applications are easy to understand, and we have the complete source code of each example. As such, it becomes much more accessible to determine if an unpacker is successful because there is no need to reverse engineer large amounts of binary code. (2) Benchmark #2 : Selected malware samples. e second data set corresponds to several malware samples from the families CryptoWall, Tinba, Gapz and Ramnit. ese samples perform many of the obfuscation techniques that Minerva aims to overcome, such as code injection combined with dynamically generated code and custom API resolution. (3) Benchmark #3 : Packed synthetic samples. We have taken a set of synthetic samples and packed them with well-known packers. In these applications, we know the applications' behaviours before packing because we design the applications; however, we do not know the exact changes the packers make on the code and, therefore, do not have ground truth about the packed applications. (4) Benchmark #4 : Real-world malware samples. is set comprises 119 malware samples from the real-world malware families listed in Table 1 . We collected seven samples from each family to maintain a balanced data set, and the samples were collected from VirusTotal. In order Table 1 : e malware families in Benchmark set #4. We collected a total of seven samples from each family.
to ensure the samples are indeed benign, we required each sample to be detected by at least 15 anti-malware vendors. Furthermore, in order to ensure certainty that the samples belong to their respective families, we required at least two vendors to label them in the same family. On average each sample had 52 anti-malware vendors report it as malicious and a median of 54. We recorded each of these samples for 25 seconds and set a max replay time of 120 minutes.
In order to assess the techniques of Minerva, we must make a fair and meaningful comparison to existing work. One approach is to compare Minerva to recently proposed unpackers like Codisasm [6] or Aranchino [34] . However, we already showed in [29] that Codisasm is very limited due to its implementation in PIN, and Aranchino is also developed on top of PIN with no additional e ort for analysing system-wide malware. Instead, we compare Minerva to the unpacker by Ugarte et al. [42] .
Ugarte et al. [42] propose a malware unpacker that is capable of analysing multi-process malware is implemented on top of QEMU.
e unpacker supports multi-process unpacking by monitor various system calls and also develop techniques for capturing memory mappings. e tool they present is only available as a web service 3 , which forces us to treat their system as a black box. Furthermore, they do not mention which OS they support in their work; however, from experimenting with the service, we conclude the analysis environment is Windows XP. We determined this because the web service responds with "Error -e sample did not start executing." when faced with applications compiled for Windows 7 and later, ID Description.
D1
Dynamically generates code and uses custom IAT resolution to resolve GetModuleHandle, GetProcAddress and ExitProcess and exits.
D2
Dynamically generates code and uses custom IAT resolution to resolve GetModuleHandle, GetProcAddress and MessageBoxA and then displays a message box.
D3
Dynamically generates code that further dynamically generates code and then uses custom IAT resolution to resolve GetModuleHandle, GetProcAddress and MessageBoxA and then displays a message box.
D4
Dynamically generates code that further dynamically generates code and then uses custom IAT resolution to resolve GetModuleHandle, GetProcAddress and ExitProcess and then exits.
C1
Opens the Windows process explorer.exe using OpenProcess, WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread, then inside the target process dynamically resolves the address of GetModuleHandle, GetProcAddress and ExitProcess, and calls each of them to exit.
C2
Opens the Windows process explorer.exe using OpenProcess, WriteProcessMemory and QueueUserAPC, then inside the target process dynamically resolves the address of GetModuleHandle, GetProcAddress and ExitProcess, and calls each of them to exit.
C4
Uses the PowerLoaderEx injection that relies on a global memory bu er and code-reuse a acks to hijack execution of explorer.exe. Inside explorer.exe code-reuse a acks transfers execution to shellcode that calls LoadLibraryA.
C5
Uses the Atombombing injection techniques that relies on the global atom tables to execute within explorer.exe. Inside explorer.exe it uses code-reuses a ack to execute a piece of shellcode that launches calc.exe.
M1
Injects code into explorer.exe similarly to A1, then inside the target process dynamically generates code that then dynamically resolves the address of GetModuleHandle, GetProcAddress and ExitProcess, and calls each of them to exit. Table 2 : Description of the samples in data set #1 and how they perform code injection.
but runs normally with Windows XP applications. As such, we wrote the samples in our data set to make sure they all execute correctly on both Windows XP and Windows 7. We will refer to the unpacker by Ugarte et al. [42] as PackerInspector.
Implementation
Minerva is built on top of PANDA [11] , which is a dynamic analysis framework based on full system emulation and utilises a recordand-replay infrastructure. All of the code on top of PANDA is built in C/C++ and the majority of our tools that process the output of the sandbox are in Python. Most of the code in Minerva's dynamic analysis is on top of PANDA; however, we have had to modify the main taint analysis plugin that comes with PANDA to be less resource intensive. Speci cally, PANDA's taint2 plugin can quickly use 40+ GB of memory, and to limit this, we removed support for taint-labels and made some data structures more simplistic.
Experimental set up
We conduct all of our Minerva experiments on a 4-core Intel-7 CPU with 4.2 GHz and a Windows 7, 32-bit guest architecture. e guest is in a closed network and connected to another virtual machine that performs network simulation using INetSim [18] . As such, malware samples that connect back to some CC server will be able to resolve DNS names, connect to every IP and also receive content. However, the content itself is the default data provided by INetsim. We executed the applications on the guest machine with a local admin account, and User Account Control (UAC) enabled. We perform no user stimulation during the analysis, and there were no applications apart from the generic Windows processes running in the guest machine itself.
Empirical evaluation of correctness
In our rst experiment, we match Minerva and PackerInspector with the ground-truth samples in benchmark set #1. For each of the samples, we capture the number of execution waves, the number of processes involved in the execution, the number of API calls observed from the last wave of each sample and the number of functions in the IAT of the unpacker's output. We match the results from the output of Minerva and PackerInspector with our ground truth data and Table 3 shows our results.
For the samples that execute in a single process, both Minerva and PackerInspector capture the number of processes and waves accurately. In two of these four samples, Minerva captures the ve expected API calls accurately, and in the other two Minerva captures slightly more than the expected number. PackerInspector, however, a ributes about 200x more API calls than the expected number to the nal wave of the execution. Furthermore, Minerva builds the IAT for the two samples accurately and a slightly larger IAT for the other two. PackerInspector is unable to produce any output with an IAT, and there is no sign of API usage in the output of PackerInspector. e reason Minerva captures slightly more API calls than expected is that the compiler, naturally, adds various function calls around the source code. PackerInspector successfully identi es the correct number of execution waves but fails to a ribute API calls accurately to unpacked code and also fails to produce any output with an IAT. Minerva, however, succeeds at both.
For the samples that perform multi-process execution, we observe that Minerva captures all processes, execution waves, API calls, and rebuilds PE les with the expected IAT. e reason Minerva does not capture slightly more API calls than the expected amount in these samples is that the nal wave occurs within an injected process and does not contain the added functions from the compiler. Surprisingly, PackerInspector fails to detect multiprocess execution in any of the samples, and we suspect this is because PackerInspector only monitors for multi-process execution via memory mapped les which none of the samples uses. From our multi-process samples, we observe the limitations of the original write-then-execute heuristic, in that it is unable to handle systemwide unpacking in a general and precise manner. However, the novel techniques introduced by Minerva are successful at this.
When matched with our ground-truth samples it is clear that PackerInspector over-approximates the API usage of the applications, is unable to output unpacked code that shows API usage when faced with obfuscations of external dependencies and underapproximates the system-wide malware execution. ese observations verify our hypothesis that state-of-the-art unpackers are unable to deal with many challenges faced by system-wide packing and that the techniques in Minerva overcome these limitations.
Empirical evaluation against selected malware
In our second experiment, we match Minerva and PackerInspector with the malware samples in data set #2. e goal of this experiment is twofold. First, we aim to measure how each unpacker captures system-wide unpacking based on the number of processes and waves they identify. Second, we aim to measure the di erence in the total amount and the unique amount of API calls observed in each malware execution. We only have access to PackerInspector via their web interface, and in this experiment, it is important to highlight the limitations of this.
e samples we analyse with Minerva are executed in Windows 7, and the samples we analyse with PackerInspector presumably execute in Windows XP. In addition to this, we do not know the state of the execution environment that PackerInspector uses to execute the malware samples, such as the processes executing on the system, the network connection, the privilege-level of the malware, the security se ings in the guest system, and so on.
is adds a level of uncertainty to the results we present in this section since we are not conducting an isolated comparison of techniques as the execution environments of the malware are, likely, signi cantly di erent.
is is particularly relevant when dealing with the samples from data set #2 because malware samples are complex applications that are sensitive to their execution environment and small changes in the environment can have a substantial impact on the malware execution. However, we still feel it is appropriate to report the results as they give certain insights into the di erences in our approaches. e results of our experiment are shown in Table 4 .
In terms of multi-process monitoring, Minerva captures more injections than PackerInspector in eight samples and fewer injections in three samples. PackerInspector misses multi-process executions in all Tinba and Gapz samples. For the Tinba samples, PackerInspector only catches the rst multi-process execution which occurs into the benign Windows process winver.exe, a process that is also started by each sample. PackerInspector misses all multi-process executions within the Gapz malware sample, and we believe there are two possible explanations for this. First, because PackerInspector exits prematurely, and second because Gapz uses the PowerLoader injection which does not rely on any of the API hooks used by PackerInspector to catch multi-process unpacking.
In one CryptoWall sample, Minerva nds one more multi-process propagation than PackerInspector, and in another sample, Minerva Table 4 : e evaluation results from matching Minerva and PackerInspector with the malware samples of data set #2. † indicates the number processes we determined to be false positives.
nds one less than PackerInspector. In both samples, both unpackers nd two injections into svchost.exe and in both cases, PackerInspector also nds injections into vssadmin.exe. Minerva also nds an injection into vssadmin.exe in the sample with ve process executions. However, we have found that these vssadmin.exe propagations correspond to false positives. In particular, we found no injections into vssadmin.exe but rather that the samples execute the following command ''vssadmin.exe Delete Shadow /All /Quiet'' using the WinExec call. We believe this call results in the memory owing into the vssadmin.exe and is, e ectively, the reason the unpackers identify execution in vssadmin.exe.
In two Ramnit samples, Minerva nds fewer injections than PackerInspector. In one of these samples, PackerInspector reports an additional injection into IEXPLORE.exe that is not identi ed by Minerva. We analysed the sample ourselves and found that the sample only injects into two IEXPLORE.exe processes if it fails to inject into two svchost.exe processes, which we observed by both Minerva and PackerInspector. However, researchers from Symantec [36] report that Ramnit also drops a le that will be loaded by each new instance of IEXPLORE.exe, which may be an explanation for why PackerInspector observes such an injection. However, we think it's most likely a result of over-approximation in PackerInspector as it would require the IEXPLORE.exe process to be launched on the system. In the other sample, PackerInspector nds an additional injection into a le with a random name which Minerva does not. Minerva, however, observes the creation of this le but does not see it execute. In the remaining Ramnit sample, Minerva captures seven more injections than PackerInspector, and both Minerva and PackerInspector identi es four injections into IEXPLORE.exe in this sample. Based on follow-up analysis, we determine six of the additional injections Minerva nds are true positives and one is a false positive. We conclude this because we found API-signatures that show injections into these processes, but not the remaining one. 4 md5sum e73806e3f41f61e7c7a364625cd58f65 5 md5sum 5384f752e3a2b59fad9d0f143ce0215a 6 md5sum c141be7ef8a49c2e8bda5e4a856386ac 7 md5sum 08ab7f68c6b3a4a2a745cc244d41d213 8 md5sum 6244604b4fe75b652c05a217ac90eeac 9 md5sum 089c5446291c9145ad8ac6c1cdfe4928 1 2 3 4-5 6-11 66% 15% 9% 5% 5% Table 9 : Number of imports per PE le.
In terms of precision for tracking API calls, there is a similar relationship between Minerva and PackerInspector as when matched with our ground-truth samples. In the samples from CryptoWall, Tinba and Ramnit, Minerva reports roughly twelve times fewer API calls within the malware execution than PackerInspector. We manually investigated several of the Tinba samples to con rm these numbers and found that Minerva captures API calls accurately within the malware execution. As such, we consider the API calls reported by PackerInspector to be a signi cant over-approximation. In addition to the total number of API calls, PackerInspector captures about three times more unique API calls in each malware execution, even in cases where Minerva nds more total API calls.
e only instances where Minerva nds more total API calls are in the Gapz samples. e reason that there is a signi cant amount of API calls in these cases is that the Gapz malware scans a remote process for gadgets and this results in an enormous amount of calls to ReadProcessMemory (about 99.985% of calls in the Minerva analyses). We believe that the reason Minerva reports more API calls than PackerInspector only in the Gapz samples, is because PackerInspector exits prematurely.
When matched with these malware samples, it is clear that PackerInspector over-approximates the API usage of the applications, both in terms of total API calls and unique APIs used. We also nd that in the majority of times, PackerInspector under-approximates the system-wide malware propagation and Minerva nds more system-wide unpacking. 10 md5sum 0ed4a5e1b9b3e374f1f343250f527167 11 md5sum e5b9295e0b147501f47e2fcba93deb6c 12 md5sum 448ce1c565c4378b310fa25b4ae3b17f 13 md5sum 33cd65ebd943a41a3b65fa1ccfce067c 14 md5sum 3bb86e6920614ed9ac5d8 f480eb437
Relevance on malware
In this experiment, we match Minerva with benchmark set #4. In total we run 119 samples through Minerva and collect (1) the number of process executions; (2) the number of waves; (3) the number of generated PE les; (4) the number of imports in the IAT of each PE le and (5) the number of sections in each PE le. Table 5 shows the number of processes and Table 6 the number of waves in our data set. We nd that a third of the samples perform multi-process execution and that roughly half have multiple execution waves, which means that a large part of all the samples with single-process execution have multi-wave execution. Table 7 shows the distribution of reconstructed PE les. We construct more PE les than the number of captured waves, which shows that some waves contain several regions that are non-related. Finally, Table 8 shows the number of sections reconstructed in each PE le and Table 9 shows the number of reconstructed imports. For roughly 20% of the PE les, we do not monitor any API calls in the code, and this is due to some PE les being a result of small amounts of taint in minor code regions.
Relevance on packers
In this experiment, we show that Minerva is relevant against publicly available packers from benchmark set #3. is experiment is common practice for unpacking engines [6, 33, 38, 42] and, therefore, natural for us to perform. We construct a simple application that will get the name of the current user and report back to us so we can verify the behaviour occurred correctly. We pack this application with 13 publicly known packers and analyse the samples in Minerva.
We show the results of our experiment in Table 10 . e table shows the number of processes, waves, PE les, and whether we found the original code or a derivative thereof, and also whether we observed the original behaviour. Minerva produced PE les for most of the packers that are very similar to the original code, including correct API calls. In general, these packers are rather simple in comparison to some of the techniques we observe in malware from the wild. For example, all but one of the packers are single-process packers.
is makes sense since the packers are not necessarily meant to be used by malicious so ware, but may be used by benign applications, which are not meant to inject into other applications. Furthermore, many of these packers rely on similar approaches for compression, e.g. the Lempel-Ziv-Markov chain algorithm, and the majority the packers used in these experiments are rather old.
Tinba case study
We now investigate in depth a case study of a real-world malware sample from the Tinba malware family 15 . Minerva outputs four PE les with sizes 12KB, 12KB, 16KB and 24KB, respectively. We manually reverse engineered the sample to fully understand the system-wide propagation and where the sample exposes its unpacked code.
e malware rst decrypts memory from its data section and then transfers execution to this code. e decrypted code injects code into the Windows process Winver.exe and from Winver.exe it further injects into explorer.exe. Table 10: e results from matching Minerva with known packers. OB indicates if we observed the original behaviour of the packed application. U indicates if we found the original code in Minerva's output.
To inject code into Winver.exe Tinba launches a new instance of Winver.exe in a suspended state. en, Tinba allocates memory on the heap of the newly started Winver.exe and copies some malicious code into this speci c memory. Tinba then overwrites six bytes of the Start function in Winver.exe with the instructions push ADDR; ret, where ADDR is some address inside the dynamically generated malicious code. E ectively, Tinba ensures execution of its malicious code in Winver.exe by overwriting an initial function in Winver.exe to hijack execution.
Minerva captures one execution wave and outputs two unpacked PE les for the code in Winver.exe, one PE le based on a single execution wave in explorer.exe and also one PE le from the unpacked code in the initial process.
e PE les produced by Minerva has 0, 11, 12 and 26 imports reconstructed. ese results capture the execution perfectly because the PE le with 0 imports is purely the push ADDR; ret instructions of the malware execution trace in Winver.exe and the rest of the PE les contain various other stages with more payload content.
Minerva correctly identi es the malicious code, both the patched code of Winver.exe and also the code on the heap that contains the core of the malware code. More importantly, the PE les precisely capture the malware execution, and from the execution trace output by Minerva, we can precisely see the exact instructions push ADDR; ret. Minerva also catches the exact malware code inside of the explorer.exe process. e PE le captured from the second execution wave in the original malware process contains 11 imports in its reconstructed IAT, ve of which are ResumeThread, CreateProcessA, WriteProcessMemory, VirtualAllocEx and VirtualProtectEx. A novice analysts can quickly determine that the execution performs a code-injection based on these API calls.
Performance evaluation
In the nal part of our evaluation, we monitor the performance of Minerva.
e authors of PANDA report that recording gives a 1.85x slowdown in comparison to QEMU alone and replaying incurs a 3.57x slowdown [11] . is is expensive in comparison to systems that rely on hypervisor-based virtualisation for recording, e.g. A erSight [8] . However, we consider PANDA's performance good enough for malware analysis in particular because the plugins that we deploy will have far more impact on the total analysis time. Naturally, the performance overhead in the recording stage can be used by the malware to evade analysis, and we discuss this further in Section 8. In this performance evaluation, we focus on the overhead of Minerva's analysis when replaying the recorded execution, and the numbers we report in this section are based on analysis of the 25 malware samples from the Ramnit, Gapz, CryptoWall and Tinba families. e blue curve of Figure 5 shows the number of instructions replayed relative to the time taken in each of the analyses. On average the replay time is 3166 seconds, resulting in a 126x slowdown of the recording time, and we analysed on average 432365 instructions per second. In comparison, the developers of PANDA report a 24.7x slowdown when tainting data sent over the network and a 67.7x slowdown for tainting a 1KB le and encrypting it with AES-CBC-128 [11] . Additionally, Figure 6 shows the number of instructions that it took to replay the samples in our data set, and we observe that for about 90% of the samples this required less than 2 billion instructions.
Another interesting metric is the speci c overhead incurred by Minerva-only code. Speci cally, there is some share of the overhead that is due to the translation of QEMU TCG instructions to LLVM instructions and also overhead that is speci c to the taint implementation of PANDA. None of these requirements is strict to Minerva, in that we are not reliant on LLVM speci cally, and PANDA's taint analysis does not focus on performance. Several systems focus on fast taint analysis [7, 16, 35] and, conceptually, the techniques of Minerva can be implemented on top of these taint libraries as well. To understand the overhead of Minerva's code, we ran the samples through a replay with LLVM-translation and taint analysis enabled, and no Minerva-speci c analysis code. is gives us a reasonable estimate for how much of the analysis time was spent in the speci c code related to Minerva. e black curve in Figure 5 shows these numbers. On average, each execution took 1275 seconds with the overhead of LLVM translation and PANDA's taint library.
is corresponds to an average of 51x slowdown, meaning that Minerva's code takes up a bit more than half of the total 126x slowdown. e amount of instructions needed to replay the samples in our data set.
e horizontal blue line shows the 90% mark.
During the replay of a malware sample, Minerva does no checking to verify if the analysis is progressing, is stuck or something similar, and the numbers above report the total time of each analysisreplay. An interesting metric in addition to the total replay time is the time it took to reveal the instructions executed in each malware sample. In Figure 7 we show the time it took to uncover 95%, %99 and %100 of the unique instructions executed by the malware samples, respectively. e numbers decrease signi cantly, and on average it took 1614, 1964 and 2543 seconds to uncover 95%, %99 and %100 of the unique instructions executed, respectively. As such, it took roughly half of the total replay time to reveal 95% of the instructions in each sample. e biggest performance bo leneck we found in Minerva is when malware makes the code execute longer via stalling loops. An example of a stalling loop from a Kovter sample 16 is shown in Figure 8 . In total, the loop does 20 million iterations with sixteen calls to functions from the Windows API in each iteration. e loop has no real e ect and is purely garbage code. In total, our 25-second recording of this sample reaches 17 million iterations before the recording is over and incurs a replay time of 3300 seconds. 16 md5 of sample 147330a7ec2e27e2ed0fe0e921d45087 e sample we observed with the longest replay time is from the Nymaim family that has a stalling loop with 1.4 billion iterations, and a er the stalling loop, it calls the Sleep function from the Windows API to further stall the execution. In total, our 25-second recording of this sample took 170,000 seconds to replay. 
LIMITATIONS
Stolen bytes and copying Windows API. Minerva's precise API capturing of API calls depends on monitoring whether the target address of branch instructions is the start of some Windows API function. Some malware use an anti-analysis technique, called stolen bytes, that copies a share of some API function to another place in memory to execute that code and then branch in the middle of the given API function. In this context, they avoid calling the beginning of the function and our technique will not capture it. One solution to this is to identify function boundaries for each API function and then monitor ranges rather than the function start.
In a more general se ing, malware can copy entire functions or modules from the Windows API and then rely on the copied code rather than calling the original Windows code. In this context, Minerva will still capture whenever system calls happen, but new measurements should be taken for identifying the copying of Windows code. One approach is to mark library code with a speci c taint label and then monitor whether library code is propagated. Naturally, this solution is subject to the limitations of taint analysis. Another approach is to incorporate forensic techniques that determine the similarity between the code in a given process and a set of external libraries, which we discuss further in the following paragraph.
Inlining and statically linked binaries. A limitation in Minerva in terms of identifying external dependencies is when malware deploys inlined or statically linked code. e di erence between this and copying external libraries as described above is that inlining and statically linking occurs at compile time where copying occurs at run time. Minerva is not capable of identifying inlined or statically linked external dependencies, and we consider this to be a slightly di erent problem, namely similarity analysis of the malware code with library implementations. However, inlining and statically linking can, of course, be used in combination with obfuscation techniques and similar, and, therefore, the problem becomes determining program equivalence in the general case, which is a well-known undecidable problem. Nonetheless, e orts can still yield positive and practical results as shown by previous work in areas such as library ngerprinting [13, 20] , structural comparison of binary code [12, 14, 30] and, most recently, similarity detection via machine learning [32, 41] .
Performance limitations. ere are currently two main performance limitations in Minerva. First, malware can detect the presence of the recording component due to the 3.56x slowdown, and second, the replaying component limits the throughput of Minerva due to its performance cost. Stalling loops seem to pose a core limitation in this context. ere is, however, previous work on how to deal with stalling loops in the context of full system emulation. Kolbitsch et al. implemented several features into the Anubis analysis system [27] .
eir approach is to implement heuristics that detect when stalling loops occur and then either disable heavy instrumentation until the stalling loop exits or force execution out of the loop. e rst approach is certainly possible to implement in Minerva, but it may run into issues if the stalling loop is also responsible for propagating executable malicious code since the taint analysis would likely be disabled. e second approach is more challenging to implement because replaying is not able to change execution-path in the guest system, as the execution is xed to the replay log.
We consider ve main avenues to improving performance. First, we can use hardware assisted virtualisation during recording and only full system emulation during replay, as suggested in A erSight [8] . Second, we can implement various on-and-o analyses during the replay similar to Kolbitsch et al. ird, we can add light anti-analysis monitoring during the recording, for example, to limit the e ectiveness of calls to functions like Sleep. In this case however, the implementation must use some form of approximation to determine the malware execution trace since taint analysis will not be available. Fourth, we can improve the speed of various parts in PANDA, such as the taint analysis plugin. Instead of converting instructions to LLVM and performing taint analysis on the LLVM code, we can adopt the taint system by DECAF, which occurs directly on the QEMU tcg instructions [16] . Finally, an interesting avenue is implementing a feedback loop between record-and-replay that based on the analysis in the replay sends information to the recording about where a delay in execution occur and how to handle it. In this way, it is possible to incrementally build up a complete execution trace of the malware without anti-analysis tricks.
RELATED WORK
Automatic unpacking. ere are many works in automatic unpacking of malware and we have already discussed several of these throughout the paper [10, 17, 21, 23, 33, 39, 42] . Some of this work considers the concept of IAT destruction [21, 28, 39] and IAT reconstruction has also been considered on a more general basis [24] . e work by Ugarte et al. [42] highlights several missing gaps in existing unpackers and proposes a system-wide approach to unpacking. However, as we observed in this paper, their approach is severely limited. In some aspects, Ugarte et al. provide a more re ned model for dynamically generated code in that they assign various labels to the memory wri en by the malware based on whether it is executed and alike. ese labels can easily be integrated into Minerva. In addition to this, they also highlight that several limitations in existing unpackers exist due to missing reference data sets, which indeed also motivated the construction of our synthetic benchmark set #1. e work that is closest to ours is Tartarus [29] and the ideas of this paper are heavily inspired by their work. We deploy a similar approach to tracing the malware throughout the whole system, however, we deploy a di erent model of dynamically generated malicious code and also propose novel algorithms for making the output suitable for follow-up analysis. In particular, the postprocessing we describe in this paper is novel and our model of dynamically generated code is explicitly connected to previous waves whereas Tartarus simply dumps the whole of tainted memory whenever a new wave executions. As such, our model is more precise and also formally de ned.
System-wide malware execution. Several works have closely considered the concept of malware executing throughout the whole system. In particular, Panorama [43] , DiskDuster [1] , Tartarus [29] and API Chaser [25] use dynamic taint analysis to capture this. Barabosch et al. has also investigated the problem with code injection by analysing memory dumps [4] and also at run time [5] . Minerva relies on the same techniques as Tartarus to trace malware execution through the system. An interesting approach at the other end of the spectrum is explored by Ispoglou and Payer in malWASH [19] , where they propose to write complex malware using exactly the paradigm of system-wide execution.
Malware disassembly. e work in this paper is closely related to techniques that focus on disassembling malicious so ware. An accurate description of our work within this domain, rather than unpacking, is a system-wide malware disassembler. We gather a precise instruction-level execution trace of the malware and then gather more content to include in the reconstructed PE le with speculative disassembly. Traditionally, disassembly techniques are split between linear sweep, as used in GNU's Objdump, and recursive traversal [9, 40] algorithms. However, there are several pieces of previous work on disassembly that speci cally target malware and these move beyond the traditional approaches. Kruegel et al. present an approach that combines a variety of techniques from control-ow analysis and statistical methods, in order to statically disassemble obfuscated binaries [31] . Kinder and Veith present an approach based on abstract interpretation that statically disassembles binaries and also resolves indirect branch instructions [26] . Rosenblum et al. present a classi cation approach to identify function entry points [37] , and Bao et al. [3] follow the same path and use machine learning and static analysis to identify functions within binaries. ey train a weighted-pre x tree that recognises function starting points in a binary le and then value-set analysis [2] with an incremental control-ow recovery algorithm to identify function boundaries.
In this paper, we proposed a system called Minerva that focuses on generic and precise malware unpacking. From a technical point of view, Minerva deploys a concatic approach with both dynamic and static analysis and partitions the malware execution trace into execution waves based on information ow analysis. Minerva precisely monitors the API-calls of the malware code and accurately correlates these to the unpacked code. Based on the output of the dynamic analysis, Minerva performs static analysis on the execution waves to output a set of reconstructed PE les with valid import address tables and patched API calls.
From a theoretical point of view, Minerva deploys a precise model of execution waves based on an information ow model that captures dynamically generated malicious code independently of who wrote the code. We came up with several novel algorithms that combine these execution waves with other artefacts collected from the dynamic analysis to carefully produce PE les that are well-suited for follow-up static analysis.
Finally, we proposed a new set of benchmark applications that exhibit unpacking behaviours with various forms of dynamically generated code, system-wide execution and import-address table destruction in order to address a missing gap in terms of groundtruth samples for testing unpackers. is benchmark suite is the rst of its kind in that previous benchmark data sets for testing automatic unpackers rely on third-party applications to perform the packing.
We evaluated Minerva against our synthetic applications, realworld malware samples and also performed a comparative evaluation. Our results show that Minerva is signi cantly more precise than previous work and outputs unpacked code that shows external dependencies, which previous work does not. Our results also show that Minerva captures system-wide unpacking in many cases where previous work fails.
